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
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
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CONSEQUENCES

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LATE REVOLUT

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EFFECTS

UPON THE

TERRITORIAL POSSESSIONS, the COMMER-CIAL INTERESTS, NAVAL STRENGTH, MANUFACTURES, POPULATION, RE-SOURCES, LANDED INTEREST, and PUB-LIC FUNDS,

GREAT BRITAIN;

COMPARATIVE REVIEW

STRENGTH, RESOURCES, AND PUBLIC CREDIT, OF THE LATE BELLIGERENT POWERS, AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE.



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LATH REVOLUTION

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COMPARATIVEREVIEW

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CONSEQUENCES, &c.

TO form a judgment of the confequences that must refult from the late important Revolution of the British Empire, it is neceffary to state the terms of the Peace, which are here briefly extracted from the treaties, and the losses and gains brought into one point of view.

The British Minister has by the late Peace, made the following national concessions.

To the AMERICANS.

The entire abfolute and fovereign independence of New Hampshire, Massachusets Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pensylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, with all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the faid United States.

A full and ample participation of the fisheries on the Banks of Newfoundland, in the Gulf of St. Laurence, and at all other *places in the fea* where the inhabitants of both countries used

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at any time heretofore to fifh; as also on the coafts, bays, and creeks of all other his Britannick Majesty's dominions in America, with liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unfettled bays, harbours, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labradore.

An evacuation with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any negroes or other property, of every port, place, and harbour within the faid United States.

A relinquishment and leaving behind in all fortifications the American artillery that may be therein.

A reftoration of all archives, records, deeds, and papers belonging to any of the faid States or their citizens, to be *forthwith* delivered to the proper flate and perfon to whom they may belong.

To FRANCE.

A new and extensive right of fishery on the coasts of Newfoundland, commencing at Cape St. John, and extending by the north and the west to Cape Raye.

The ceflion in full right of the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon.

A right of fishing in the Gulf of St. Laurence.

The reftoration of the Island of St. Lucia.

The ceffion and guarranty of the Island of Tobago.

The

The ceffion and guarranty of the river Senegal and its dependencies, with the forts of St. Louis, Podor, Galam, Arguin, and Portendie.

The reftoration of the Island of Gorée.

A participation of the gum trade.

A reftoration of all the eflublishments which belonged to France at the commencement of the present war on the coast of Orixa and in Bengal, with liberty to furround Chandernagore with a ditch.

An engagement to fecure to the fubjects of France in that part of India, as also on the coafts of Orixa, Coromandel, and Malabar, a fafe, free, and independent trade.

The reftoration and guarranty of Pondicherry and Karical.

An engagement to procure to ferve as a dependency round Pondicherry the two diffricts of Valanour and Bahour.

And as a dependency round Karical, the four contiguous Magans.

The possession of Mahé, and of the Comptoir at Surat.

A fafe, free, and independent trade to be fecured to France by Great Britain in this as in the above-mentioned parts of India.

An engagement, that in cafe the British allies in India do not accede to the foregoing terms in favour of France, in four months after the fame are proposed to them, his Britannick Majesty shall not give them directly or indirectly

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indirectly any affiftance against the French poffeffions or the ancient possefilions of the French allies in India.

The abrogation and suppression of all the articles relative to (the destruction of the fortifications of) Dunkirk from the treaty of Utrecht 1713, inclusively to this time.

The possession of the reftored and conceded towns and comptoirs in the East Indies, as also of the territories to be procured by Great Britain for France, to ferve as dependencies round Pondicherry and Karical, to take place in fix months after the ratification of the definitive treaty.

To SPAIN.

. . . .

The Island of Minorca, East Florida, and West Florida.

GREAT BRITAIN receives in compensation for all the foregoing concessions :

From the AMERICANS.

An earnest recommendation from Congress to the legislatures of the respective States, to provide for the restitution of all estates, &c. that have been confiscated belonging to real British subjects, and also of the estates, &c. of perfons (loyalists) resident in districts in the posfession of his Majesty's arms, and who have not borne arms against the United States, and that that perfons (loyalists) of any other defcription, shall have free liberty to go to, and remain in, any of the faid States for twelve months, unmolested in their endeavours to obtain the restitution of such of their estates, &cc. And that such restorations shall be recommended as aforesaid, to be made to such perfons (loyalists) upon their refunding the purchase money paid since the confiscation by the present posfessions.

From FRANCE.

The reftoration of the illands of Granada and the Granadines, St. Vincent's, Dominica, St. Christopher's, Nevis, and Montferrat.

A guarranty of the possession of Fort James, and of the River Gambia.

An engagement that in cafe the French allies in India do not accede to the terms of the treaty in favour of France, in four months after the fame are proposed to them, his Most Christian Majesty shall not give his faid allies, directly or indirectly, any affistance against the British possession, or the ancient possessions of the British allies in India.

From S.P.A.I.N.

A permission to cut logwood in a district to be fixed upon within fix months after the exchange of the ratifications, provided such permission

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mission is not confidered as derogatory to the Spanish soucreignty.

The reftitution of the islands of Providence and the Bahamas.

In this extract of the terms of peace, notice is not taken of *articles totally reciprocal*, fuch as the fuing for debts without legal impediment, the exchange of prifoners, &c.

The contrast between what Great Britain concedes and receives by these terms of pacification, is dreadful indeed.

The national loss, in respect of territory in different quarters of the globe, in respect of the fur trade in Canada, the gum trade in Africa, the fisheries of Newfoundland and of British America, the fortifications of Dunkirk, and other difadvantageous parts of the treaty, have been to ably pointed out in both Houses of Parliament, by noble Lords and other diftinguished members, that the author shall touch as little as possible upon those supports, already fo preferably difcussed, and shall study to confine himself to the investigation of other fatal effects not before adverted to, and many more are yet to be dreaded, which time alone can bring to our knowledge.

The author intends alfo to take a fhort comparative review of the fituations of the late Belligerent powers at the conclusion of the peace, in point of ftrength, refources, and public credit.

Amongft

Amongst some of the fatal effects of this peace, not before adverted to, it has laid the foundation of the inevitable ruin of those West India islands that yet remain dependent upon Great Britain; one large stride to which has already taken place, by the great reduction, in

already taken place, by the great reduction, in confequence of the peace, in the prices of their produce now at market; for loaded as they are with immenfe duties, freights, and infurance, they do not now clear upon fale the actual charges they ftand at; much lefs produce any provision for the bills of exchange, which it is well known the planters draw upon their correfpondents here, on the credit of their remittances of produce, fo that befides the rifque of bankruptcies to the acceptors of fuch bills, when the remittances fall fhort, the weight and force of this dreadful lofs muft ultimately fall back upon the planters, who muft confequently be involved in the higheft difficulties.

Nor will the reduction of charges in freight and infurance upon the peace remittances relieve these planters, as the immense duties they are loaded with, unless wisely transferred to other more eligible objects, must still remain upon home consumption,* and as that monopoly which

* The FORMER PEACE DUTIES.

	s. d. Tot	al.
On rums, Cuftom . Excife .	0 4 16 7	167
Excife	20 50	20 per Gallon.
On fugars, Cuftom	405	18
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nate the bwhich supported the value of them under former peace establishments is now at an endy. And the objects of that monopoly whole vaft confumptions were confined to the produce of the British plantations, can now go unrestrained to market at the French islands, and there purchase upon much more advantageous terms than the British islands can afford : Nor, if they ever could afford to fell upon equal terms with the French islands, will it be in their power to supply such customers, because the planters are fo deeply in debt at home that their plantations are in general mortgaged to the British merchants, who are exactly acquainted with the produce of fuch plantations, which produce the planters are bound to remit to the mortgagees, as well towards the liquidation of the mortgages, as for the purposes of freighting home the fhips of the mortgagees, who also in their capacity of factors for the planters derive a commission from the fales of such produce, which freights and commissions have been the ftrongeft

The PRESENT DUTIES.

On rums, Cuftom $0 5 \frac{9}{20}$ Excife $6 6 \frac{4}{20}$ $6 11 \frac{13}{20}$ per Gallon.

On fugars, Cuftom . . . 12 $3\frac{4}{1}$ per Cwt.

And fugars were fold by auction within these few days at 18s. 6d. per Cwt. for exportation, viz. exclusive of the duty, so that the duties on these fugars would have been at the rate of above 60 per Cent. on their *i cal value* at market. Arongest inducements that the British merchants had to lend their money upon West India plantations.

And fhould the planters in future break through this reftraint, in defiance of their engagements with their creditors in Great Britain, and difpose of their produce upon the islands to such itinerant merchants as may come to market there; in that case the British ships must return home empty, which must prove a fatal blow to our external commerce and navigation.

On the other hand, divested as we now are of the *former monopolies*, the freights of the British ships home must glut the markets here, and of course destroy the fale of the produce; so that it will become the interest of the planters in our islands, nay it will become absolutely necessary to their future existence, to throw themselves into the arms of America, or of the house of Bourbon.

To prevent which will require a British fleet to be constantly kept up there, at least equal in force to the fleets of the house of Bourbon and America, by which means our peace establishment in that quarter, will become as expensive as in the midst of war.

If we were then under the dire neceffity of being the fecond or third power in Europe to acknowledge American independence; we fhould certainly not have made conceffions of fo much magnitude to us and to them, with-

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out fome commercial stipulations in our favour, as that was the right time to infift upon fuch, and if then compleated, it would have been now unneceffary to bring a bill into the British Parliament, as has been the cafe within these few days, "for the provisional establishment " of trade with the United States of North " America;" which States, even by the acknowledgement of the Minister himself who has made this peace, (when lately speaking in his place of the recommendation of the loyalists) could not, he faid, be supposed to carry themselves in their infancy, with that authority that old governments did.

But to digrefs a little with regard to the loyalifts: If the infant States of America are defirous to evince themfelves a great people, and worthy of the confequence that fortune has favoured them with, they fhould of their own free will, uninfluenced by any recommendation, at once grant a general amnefty to the loyalifts of all defcriptions, and liberally reftore to them all their poffeffions; which conduct would more firmly eftablifh the American States as a nation, than any acts they have yet atchieved, or can undertake.

In the East Indies we not only concede and reftore a vast territory to France, but we are bound to procure them immense environs to their former possession, within fix months from the definitive treaty of peace; and are precluded from affisting our allies there, in case they do not not accede to fuch procuration, within four months after it is communicated to them; fo that they must either agree thereto, however dangerous to their interests, within that time, or fall unprotected facrifices to the French.-But the territorial poffeffion is not the only ill confequence arifing from this part of the treaty; for we thereby lofe, and totally abandon, that preference of market for the manufactures of these territories, so to be procured to France, which the British East India Company enjoyed; but which must now be turned over to the French, by which means we shall be shut out from fupplying the German and other foreign markets with fuch piece goods as those territories produce, which trade will from henceforth fall into the hands of the French.

And we not only allow the French a large portion of the fifheries of Newfoundland and the Gulf of St. Laurence, but we alfo grant a full, entire, unreftrained, and unlimited right of fifhing to the American States, as well on all the banks of Newfoundland and in the Gulf of St. Laurence, as alfo on the coafts, bays, and creeks of all other his Majefty's dominions in America, with liberty to cure the fame on any of the unfettled bays, barbours, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Iflands, and Labradore,* all which fifheries they can make C 2 much

* It is to be prefumed that the Americans will not long fuffer these places to be unsettled; and it is but reafonable

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much greater advantage of from their vicinity than we can, and they will, from many circumstances, foon be able to underfell us at the European markets, which must of course deftroy not only our valuable trade in that line, but also our best nursery for seamen; and, as if there was to be no limits to the requifitions of the Americans on the one hand, or to our concessions on the other, they, not fatisfied with even the foregoing range of fisheries, are to have liberty to fifh at all other places in the fea, where the inhabitants of both countries ufed at any time heretofore to fifh, fo that we may not only expect to hear of them at Davis's Streights and Greenland, but at the Shetland and Irish fisheries; and we may also be favoured with the fight of a number of buffes under the Thirteen Stripes, filhing off the Land's End, in Yarmouth Roads, or perhaps even pursuing a scull of herrings up the Thames. -For the wording of the article will very well bear a conffruction of that nature.

But these concessions are, in the opinion of that liberal Minister who made them, of no national consequence, for he contends that trade of all forts should be free, open, and unrestrained as air, and that monopolies are of no fervice to this country. Pity it is that he did not

fonable to conclude, that their being thus privileged to have recourse thereto, must be an effectual bar to any British subjects attempting a settlement there, which would produce eternal disputes.

not prevail upon the other contracting powers to be of the fame opinion, as in that cafe, it is to be prefumed, they would not have been fo eager to fecure what we have fo readily conceded, and at the fame time fet so very little value upon, that even from the infant and unauthoritative States of America, we have not been able to obtain so much as one fingle positive stipulation in our favour, for the concession of thirteen Colonies, comprehending by the new boundaries a new edition of territory of eighteen thousand square miles, including many Indian nations in alliance with Great Britain, feveral British forts, passes, and carrying places, forming a commanding key to the remaining British provinces of Nova Scotia and Canada, and deftroying the furr trade of the latter; as also for the conceffion of all the illands within twenry leagues of the coafts of the American States, together with an unbounded right of fishing, a right of making new fettlements on the coafts of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labradore. A reftoration of American artillery and other property, and of the archives, records, deeds, and papers belonging to any of the faid States, or their citizens .- And though indeed we have got, in lieu of these immense conceffions, a recommendation of the loyalifts to the different States, and a permiftion for them to remain for twelve months in endeavouring to obtain the reflict you of their property; yet we have not fecured for these very unfortunate and

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and deferted men, a ftipulation of even fo trifling a fecurity to them, as the reftoration of any of the *archives*, *records*, *deeds*, and *papers* belonging to *them*, and which might in future fhew their claims to property in those States.

But notwithftanding the very liberal fentiments of our Minister, that the peace had only removed monopolies, and that monopolies in trade ought not to be allowed; yet our former enjoyments of them, was what chiefly contributed to render us rich and respectable; and, unfortunately for this nation, it will be found that the deprivation of the monopolies of our Canadian furr trade, our fisheries, our gum trade, our trade in the East and in the West, with our consequent deficiency of trade in Europe, will be the means of stagnating our external commerce, which must prove directly deftructive of our naval force.

Becaufe we do not ftand fo much in need of fhips, as of a *fucceffion of feamen*, on which we must depend for a fuperiority at fea, and which cannot be acquired by any other means than *external commerce*; to the extent of which the number of *feamen* must always be proportioned.

The *fame caufes* will fo evidently occafion a decay in our manufactures as not to require animadverfion, and *that decay* will occafion two other fatal confequences.

1st. Depopulation.

2d. The transferring of the mysteries of our manufactures into other countries.

Because the unemployed manufacturers, oppressed with the heavy taxes *imprudently* accumulated on all the *necessaries of life*, will *emi*grate to more favourable situations, and of course carry with them the *mysteries* of their business.

And all these causes combined must be the means of diminishing our national resources; for if they have principally depended upon landed property, and extent of territorial posfessions, there now remains but a very small remnant of what heretofore composed this once great empire; and from what has been already stated, our remaining possessions in the West Indies, and British America, do not appear to be in the most permanent state of dependence upon Great Britain; nor have our possessions in Newfoundland, Africa, and the East Indies a much more favourable aspect.

If our refources have of late years principally depended upon our trade and manufactures, in that cafe they must of course increase or diminish in proportion to the extent of our external commerce; which must have been best fecured and *extended* by the monopolies of external markets; which we have abandoned by the late concessions, and which monopolies of external markets differ widely from the *internal* monopolies, whether of large compa-

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nies, or individuals, trading in the fame king-

Thus the conceffions of this peace, must inevitably, and speedily drag down upon us,

The Stagnation of external Commerce.

The confequent destruction of our naval force. The decay of our manufactures.

The confequent depopulation of this country, and

The transplanting of our manufactures into other countries.

The diminution of our refources, either as arising from extent of territory, or from extent of commerce.

The conftant apprehensions of the loss of more territories abroad, or the expense of a war establishment to secure them.

Under all which circumstances,

The value of lands must decrease.

The fecurity of our public funds must become worse. *

And to fum up all in the words of the Minister who has made this peace,

The Sun of Great Britain must fet to rife no more.

Or to preferve fome faint glimmering of this fetting luminary, we must, notwithstanding the pacific disposition of the nation, soon plunge into a fresh war, under a thousand more unfavourable circumstances, than we now, armed at

* Stocks are now from 20 to 25 per cent lower than at the close of last war. at all points, have *recreantly* given up the conteft, without obtaining an honourable or advantageous peace.

Had indeed fuch a peace been hurried up, when a whole army was loft under Gen. Burgoyne, or another under Lord Cornwallis, with our islands daily falling to the enemy, it might have claimed fome excuse from the perilous complexion of those periods; but after having recovered those blows, and fince then glorioufly conquered in the West Indies, acquired large territories in the East, and in fuch a fituation there as at leaft to enable us to hold them, destroyed another Spanish Armada before Gibraltar, and relieved that important fortrefs, in the teeth of the united house of Bourbon. Under all these advantageous, circumstances, to submit to a peace upon such terms, is too dreadful to bear reflection.

But to extenuate the debafing circumftances, and dreadful confequences of this peace, the minister who made it, and his adherents, have laid great stress upon our want of *nati*onal refources to profecute the war, and have magnified to a great degree, the superiority of our late enemies therein.

That the contrary was however the cafe, will it is conceived, fully appear upon due inveftigation.

For upon an impartial review of the fituation of our enemies at the conclusion of the late peace and armiftice,

D

Holland

Holland will be found difcontented at home, her maritime commerce, the great fource of her wealth, annihilated, and falling into the hands of the armed neutrality; who are not bound by any reftrictions, to relinquifh thefe new channels of trade, and of accumulating wealth; the most valuable possefilions of the Dutch abroad, either in our hands, or in the hands of France, and they in every point of view, weak and impotent as an enemy.

America as it is well known, has been for a long time in the last stages of political confumption, her currency depreciated almost to the degree of blank paper, her armies unpaid, in confequence whereof infurrections of her troops had taken place, fix out of the thirteen ftates refusing their quotas of men and money, most of the remaining feven, fupplying their quotas in a feeble unwilling manner, almost the whole burthens lying upon the state. of Penfylvania, and one or two more, who were thereby drained to the last extremity; alarmed and jealous at the hold that the French troops had got in their territories; their commerce, the only fource of their wealth, ftagnated by the power of our fleets and privateers on their coafts, in the West Indies, and in the channel ;, their inhabitants of courfe falling back upon themfelves, in murmurings, poverty, and difgust; the British arms in posseffion

fion of many ftrong and commanding pofts, along an extensive range of their country.

The American armies, feeble, and deranged from the different terms of their fervitude; difcontented, and anxious to return home; a number, and no contemptible number of loyalists, not only in the British garrifons, but alfo in the very heart of their states, ready to feize upon the first favorable opportunity to throw off the mark; added to all there and many more circumstances of internal distres, the manufactures of Europe, and all the neceffaries of life, raifed to a most exorbitant rate, their tillage and internal improvements nearly annihilated, their independence not acknowledged by more than France, and Holland. out of all the European States, and of courfe their trade and credit with Europe, confined and limited. Yet from these people, in this wretched fituation, Great Britain has not obtained for the immense concessions she has made. one fingle politive flipulation in her favor.

Spain will be found fo utterly averfe to the independence of North America, that though fhe madly combined with France in war against Great Britain, with hopes of poffeffing herfelf of Jamaica and Gibraltar, yet fo fenfible is Spain of her own interests, that the has not yct been brought to acknowledge that independence, well knowing that her valuable poffeffions in South America, must, as well as the British West India Islands, and remaining provinces of

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of Nova Scotia and Canada, be ultimately fubjugated by North America. With a formidable rebellion also broke out in the heart of Spanish America, which had not only curtailed a very large portion of her remittances from thence; but co-operating with the bad fuccefs of the war had fo reduced the publick credit of Spain, that it was fcarce poffible for her under edicts threatning the most severe penalties for refulal, to force the fecurities of her government into circulation, even at almost any discount; her lots in men and money before Gibraltar inc edible, her troops at the Havanah fickly, and dispirited, and her ships both there and at home in the most wretched condition. Yet from Spain, in this exhausted situation, Great Britain has not obtained for Minorca and the Florida's more than the infignificant Iflands of Providence, and the Bahamas, with permission of cuing logwood at fome future day, the terms of which are too degrading to require a comment.

If it is contended that, though this was the cafe with Holland, America, and Spain, yet France was powerful in refources, and alone able to cope with Great Britain; how far will this be found really to be the cafe upon a fair inveftigation?

ourfelves got poffetlion of ten ships of her line in the last campaign, which alone shews our great superiority over France. Many of her remaining

maining thips in the most thattered condition, and most desperate state of repair, and several of those in quarters of the world where they cannot readily be reinstated; deficient in feamen to man even the thips the has fit for actual fervice; reduced, as she hitherto has been, to the neceffity of supplying that deficiency with land forces, which ever has given us (and ever will, as long as that continues to be the cafe) a decided fuperiority over her, in manœuvring and fighting of thips-Her fitheries deftroyed by the poffeffion of the iflands of St. Pierre and Miquelon-The ifland of St. Lucia, the lock and key of the French West India islands, in our poffeffion-Her territories in the East Indies and in Africa alfo in our poffetfion - Her fleet and army, fharing in the difgraces and mifcarriages before Gibraltar-Her private trade, her transports, her maritime supplies, to and from all quarters, falling into our hands-Her government as well as her merchants groaning under the weight of advances to America, daily bankruptcies enfuing from the defalcation of American remittances - And, above all, her financial refources fo drained, her national credit fo bad, as lately to have found the greatest difficulty in borrowing at one time the fum of. two millions, and at another time the fum of four millions sterling, and even this at the enormous rate of 15 per cent. annuities for the first ten years, and 5 per cent. from thence until redeemed.

Which,

Which, fuppofing the interest to be regularly paid under the French government, irretrievably finks a fum, equal to the entire principal in fix years, together with a premium of 2 threefourths per cent. thereon.* The principal debt fill fubject to the enormous interest of 15 per cent. per annum, for four years more, which is equal to another irretrievable loss of feventeen-usenty-fifths of the principal; and then her government, if she preferves faith with

ber creditors, still subject to the principal debt, bearing from thenceforth an interest of 5 per cent. per annum.

So that the French loan of last year was negotiated, and with great difficulty too, at a loss of full 100 per cent. upon the 1um borrowed, more than the loan negotiated for Great Britain, which was made at 5 feven-eights per cent. every douceur included, notwithstanding every difadvantageous appearance of public affairs that then lowered over this country, but which were foon after difpelled by the most glorious reverse of fortune, though used to fo very bad purpose, in the conclusion of the peace.

To equalize then the terms of the French loan with that of our last losn, France may be faid to have borrowed *twelve millions* sterling, at nearly the same rate of interest that we borrowed f_{\star} . 13,500,000 but with this most material

* Calculating the intereft on the accumulating intereft at the fame rate of 15 per cent. terial difference, that whilft we received the full and *bona fide* fum borrowed; France, owing to the badnefs of her national credit, only received 50 per cent. thereon, or in other terms fix millions fterling, in full compensation for the nominal loan of twelve millions fterling.

And in the profecution of this campaign had the war continued, neither Spain or America would have been able to proceed, without affiftance from France, and the must also have funded for the extraordinaries of her navy and army, which, from a principle of gafconade, fhe let run into arrear fince the year 1778, and which must now amount to an amazing fum; belides all which, the must have made provifion for the current year; fo that the must either have borrowed this year, the immense sum of twenty to twenty-five millions' fterling, or have flood still. And it is more than probable, that the government of France would not have had credit, either with her own Subjects, or with foreigners, to have effected fuch a loan upon any terms, or if the did, must have fubmitted to terms as expensive to her upon that fum, as it would have been upon Great Britain to raife fifty or fixty millions sterling, which if even fo much was neceffary would not have been difficult, whilft-taxes were found to fecure payment of the intereft, with which we are amply provided. And if either the First Lord of the Treasury, or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who were concerned in making this peace,

peace, will avow that that is not the cafe, the author here pledges himself to the public, to refute fuch avowal.

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These circumstances then must have reduced France, in the course of the ensuing campaign, to the most deplorable condition, and would have forced her to sue to Great Britain for peace, which the might have dictated to all the belligerent powers; besides which France must have seen herself at the eve of a continental war, as in case of such between the Emperor, Russia, and the Porte, of which there is every prospect, the House of Bourbon must inevitably have been involved therein, had the war with Great Britain continued, and in all probability neither France or Spain can long avoid being fo involved.

Which prospect alone should have afforded the strongest grounds for our Minister to have infifted upon an honorable and advantageous peace; or to have purfued the war with vigor. Yet notwithftanding all these circumstances we have not obtained from France, one substantial concession; for the islands restored by her, must soon, as has been shewn, fall into the hands of America, or of the House of Bourbon - it must therefore have been much more advantageous to the nation, to have raifed taxes for one or two more campaigns, than to have fubmitted to a peace, which cannot be permanent, because it is not only disbonorable, but in the highest degree injurious to the national interefts;

terests; and must terminate in the destruction of those very resources, which, it is pretended by the friends of that negotiation, it was meant to fave.

What has already been faid must, it is prefumed, fully prove the national ftrength, and the uti poffidetis, to be altogether in our favor. The author shall therefore for the prefent wave any further comments upon these points, except barely to glance at the great, and hitherto unknown strength of our navy, confisting, as lately fell from the highest authority, of 109 fhips of the line; compleatly manned with feamen; a naval force, confidering their condition and manning, fully fufficient, under prudent dispositions, to keep the whole world in awe, whill the united fleets of the Houfe of Bourbon amounted to no more than 123 fail of the line, in the most wretched condition, and not half manned.

Having just touched upon this circumstance fo highly in our favor, the author now proceeds to take fome notice of *our public credit*.

For which purpole, it is neceffary to bring to recollection, a fact universally known and admitted, viz. that from the nature of our legiflative fecurity, it is in no case neceffary for Great Britain to do more than *raife by taxes* as much money as will, after defraying the expence of collection, pay the *interest* of fuch loans, as become neceffary for the fupport of government. And the reason is obvious, be-E

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caufe on the credit of a government formed as ours is, which however changeable in the members of its administration, is permanent in its *bafis*; the stock itself, or rather the funded debt of government, for which the three estates of King, Lords, and Commons are security, is always a marketable commodity, and must continue to be so as long as the interest is secured, which never can fail whils taxes are found to produce such interest, with which we are amply provided, and if disputed, the author will, as he has before mentioned, undertake to prove it.

This has given to decided an advantage to Great Britain in money concerns, that individuals, though members of a flate at war with us, are much more inclinable to lend their money on the credit of our government, than on that of their own.

For neither the absolute monarchial governments of France, Spain, and many other European states, which of course must be dependent on the will of one man; nor the democratic government of Holland, which is divided into a great variety of parts, independent of each other, and of which the infant states of North America bear a refemblance — can possibly be deemed as good securities, for money borrowed on national credit, as the solemn, substantial, and effectual security of a British Act of Parliament, which at once pervades the whole kingdom in the establishment of taxes, and and affigns to the creditors of each loan, certain specific revenues, for the payment of the interests on which such loans are borrowed, granting them also an engagement to make good any deficiencies, in cafe any should accrue, with the counter-fecurity of the finking fund-referving to government the power only of an equitable redemption of the loan.

This grand fecurity, at once makes our national debts ideal; fo that we only feel the burthen of the interests they are subject to, and makes the poffeffion of this ideal property as substantially useful to the holders, as any real property can possibly be-for if they prefer the interest allotted to the loan, they regularly receive that at the Bank of England, which is prepared for the payment by a transfer of the revenues appropriated thereto, from the receipt of the Exchequer, to the Bank for that purpose. Or if the holders prefer realizing this ideal property, that fecurity of interest renders it every day negotiable upon the Stock Exchange.

From hence it is evident, that no nation upon earth, and it may perhaps be with fafety faid, that not all the nations upon carth have been, for a feries of years, able to contend with Great Britain, as far as money, the great finews of war, is requifite.

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Why then, armed as we lately have been at at all points-with the trumpet of victory refounding from all quarters - with the face of our

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our contest entirely changed in our favor with ample refources in our hands for a ten years war, if neceffary — with a naval force, hitherto unparalled in history — with our enemies exhausted in all quarters to the last degree, and gasping at our set — the House of Bourbon too, at the eve of a continental war — Why? — let it be feriously and solemnly demanded — Why? — at such conjuncture, submit to the most degrading peace, that ever difgraced the annals of, and the most disadvantageous that ever dragged down ruin upon, any nation !

A peace dictated in the first instance, by the infant, unauthoritative states of America; without the grant of a fingle favourable stipulation to the mother country; a nation till then the most powerful in the world, whether confidered for valuable possession, for naval force to protect, or for resources to support them; when this nation, so circumstanced, condescended to receive a peace from the American States; it is not very supprising, that the old and established kingdoms of France, and Spain, should presume upon the same grounds, and each dictate their separate terms.

If on the one hand, the Minister who made this peace has upon the negotiation, been ignorant of the power, and refources of his own country; of the relative fituations of the powers he was treating with, and of the confequences that must naturally flow from every every particular of the treaty; how unworthy must he have been, of employment in that exalted line? If on the other hand, these great national facrifices have been made, to gratify the unbounded ambition, the lust of power, the tenacity of place, or any other private propensity, of one man, or at most of a few individuals; how much is the fate of this country to be lamented, and how strongly and virtually are *parliament* bound to the people, to use every precaution, to prevent the possibility of fuch circumstances ever taking place in future?

For which purpose the author has it in contemplation to offer some hints; and also to endeavour to shew the true causes of the late fatal dismemberment of the British Empire, by impartially tracing them up to their fources.

London, Feb. 20, 1783.

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